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COPYRIGHT TERMINATION AND TECHNICAL 
STANDARDS 
Jorge L. Contreras and Andrew T. Hernacki* 
ABSTRACT 
Technical standards, which enable products manufactured by 
different vendors to work together, form the basis of the modem 
technological infrastructure. Yet an obscure provision of the U.S. 
Copyright Act, enacted to allow authors and composers to profit from 
the later success of their works, now threatens to disrupt this critical 
technological ecosystem. Enacted in 1976, Section 203 of the 
Copyright Act permits the author of a copyrighted work to revoke 
any copyright license or assignment between thirty-five and forty 
years after the grant was made. For grants made in 1978, the first 
year to which Section 203 applies, terminations could first be made in 
2013, and in the music and publishing industries such terminations, 
and the concomitant litigation, have already begun. 
Technical standards are also treated as copyrightable works, and 
arguably the provisions of Section 203 apply to them. Numerous 
standards published in 1978 are still in use, and each year the number 
of standards potentially subject to Section 203 termination will grow. 
But unlike the composers and authors whom Section 203 was 
intended to protect, contributors to technical standards are usually 
engineers employed by large corporations, research institutions, or 
government agencies who make such contributions without 
additional compensation. Standards are thus unburdened by the 
copyright royalty obligations that characterize musical compositions, 
books, and other works of authorship. The termination of customary 
royalty-free copyright licenses granted by contributors to standards 
organizations or their heirs could thus have a significant disruptive 
effect on the standardization process and impose a substantial new 
cost on industries that are standards-dependent (a cost most likely to 
be passed through to consumers). 
The application of Section 203 to technical standards, however, is 
not straightforward. This article, for the first time, assesses Section 
203 in terms of its applicability to technical standards documents. In 
particular, it analyzes considerations of joint authorship, works-
made-for-hire, and derivative works under Section 203 to an area that 
was clearly not contemplated by Congress when it enacted the 
221 
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statute. We conclude that, although Section 203 is theoretically 
applicable to technical standards, several statutory obstacles would 
impede the wholesale termination of standards-related license grants. 
Nevertheless, in order to avoid costly and time-consuming litigation, 
we recommend that Congress or the courts explicitly acknowledge 
the inapplicability of Section 203 to technical standards. 
* Jorge L. Contreras, Associate Professor, American University Washington College 
of Law. Andrew T. Hernacki, Associate, Venable, LLP. The authors gratefully 
acknowledge comments and suggestions by Yvette Liebesman. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since its release in 1978, the Village People's iconic song YMCA. 
has been a regular feature at weddings, school dances, and seventh-
inning stretches. IETF RFC 749, also published in 1978, is a 
computer networking protocol relating to an Internet precursor 
known as Telnet. 1 There are few outward similarities between the 
catchy song ("Young man, there's no need to feel down .... ")2 and 
the network protocol ("The SUPDUP-OUTPUT protocol provides a 
means to access the virtual display support provided by the SUPDUP 
protocol ... within the context of a standard TELNET connection.").3 
Yet, these and other works published in 1978 and thereafter may soon 
share a common headache: copyright litigation. 
In 2012, Village People front-man Victor Willis brought and won a 
lawsuit under Section 203 of the Copyright Act, successfully 
terminating the rights in YMCA. and other songs that he granted to 
his record label, Scorpio Music, back in 1978.4 Broadly speaking, 
Section 203 permits the author of a copyrighted work to terminate the 
grant of any license or assignment of that work starting thirty-five 
years, and ending forty years, after the grant was first made.5 
Following such a termination, any transferred rights in the copyright 
revert back to the author or his heirs, notwithstanding any contractual 
language to the contrary.6 
The reversion permitted by Section 203 of the Copyright Act/ was 
intended to enable authors who were young and unrecognized at the 
time of their initial grants to recover greater rewards if their works 
eventually became successful.8 For example, in 1938 Jerry Siegel 
1. See Bernard Greenberg, Request for Comments 749 - Telnet SUDUP-OUTPUT 
Option, INTERNET ENG'G TASK FORCE paras. 4-5, at 2 (Sept. 18, 1978), 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc749. 
2. VILLAGE PEOPLE, Y.MC.A, on CRUISIN' (Casablanca Records 1978). 
3. Greenberg, supra note 1, at para. 4. 
4. Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 1lcvl557 BTM(RBB), 2012 WL 1598043, at *1-2, 
5 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012). 
5. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006). 
6. I d. § 203(b ). 
7. For older works, Section 304 of the Copyright Act provides a similar reversion. 17 
U.S.C. § 304 (2006). 
8. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the 
"Inalienable" Right to Terminate, 62 FLA. L. REv. 1329, 1342-46 (2010); PeterS. 
Menell & David Nimmer, Pooh-Poohing Copyright Law's "Inalienable" Termination 
Rights, 57 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 799, 804-08 (2010); Richard Busch, Fighting 
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and Joseph Shuster, the creators of the Superman comic book 
character, sold their rights to the predecessor of DC Comics for 
$130.9 Siegel and Shuster both died penniless in the 1990s, leaving 
nothing to their heirs. 10 Superman, in the meantime, earned billions 
for his corporate owners. 11 
Termination rights under Section 203 are not absolute, and there 
are several exceptions that exempt certain categories of works from 
its reach. 12 For example, grants covering works-made-for-hire are 
exempt from termination, 13 and if a single work has multiple authors, 
a majority is required to exercise a termination. 14 Moreover, 
termination under Section 203 only prohibits further exploitation of 
the original copyrighted work, but not of any authorized derivative 
works. 15 These exceptions, however, are poorly defined within the 
statute and untested in the courts. 
The recent case involving the Village People, Scorpio Music S.A. v. 
Willis, 16 as well as others, 17 have thrust Section 203 into the limelight 
for the Right to Superman's Copyright: More Brutal than Anything Lex Luther Could 




9. Busch, supra note 8. 
10. ld. 
11. Jd. DC Comics' owner, Warner Brothers, spent a decade in litigation with Seigel's 
and Shuster's heirs. Larson v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-08400-0DW 
(RZx), 2013 WL 1694448, at *6 (D.D.C., Apr. 18, 2013) (granting summary 
judgment for DC Comics and holding a 2001 agreement between Seigel's heirs and 
DC Comics was binding and, therefore, precluded exercising of their termination 
right); DC Comics v. PAC Pictures Corp., No. CV-10-3633 ODW (RZx), 2012 WL 
4936588, at *8 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 17, 2012) (granting summary judgment in favor of DC 
Comics and holding that Schuster's heirs were not entitled to exercise their 
termination rights). 
12. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)-(b) (2006). 
13. See id. § 203(a). 
14. Seeid. § 203(a)(l). 
15. Jd. § 203(b)(l) ("A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its 
termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its 
termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination 
of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated 
grant."). 
16. No. llcvl557-BTM(RBB), 2012 WL 1598043, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012). 
17. See, e.g., Complaint at paras. 1-2, 6, 23, 43(b), Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson, 919 
F. Supp. 2d 1054 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2012) (No. CV 12-02725 ABC (FFNX)) 
(alleging that seven of famed singer Ray Charles' children are not entitled, under 
Section 203, to terminate the transfer of over fifty of Charles' musical compositions to 
the Ray Charles Foundation); Complaint at paras. 1, 5-7, 65-69, Coots Baldwin v. 
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after lying dormant for three decades. While record labels and movie 
studios prepare for what will undoubtedly develop into plentiful 
litigation, 18 Section 203, by its terms, reaches beyond the 
entertainment industry and has the potential to disrupt the less 
glamorous, but more technologically critical, world of technical 
standards. 
There is little doubt that Section 203 will have a significant impact 
on the music and publishing industries in the coming years, but how 
will it affect technical standards? In answering this question, this 
article examines how Section 203 may impact standards documents 
in the context of the following doctrines: (1) the creation of standards 
as joint works, (2) application of the work-made-for-hire exception, 
and (3) the role of the derivative works exception. Further, this 
article argues that the underlying purpose of the termination right-
protecting authors against unremunerative transfers-is inapplicable 
in light of the non-remunerative nature of standards submissions to 
standards development organizations (SDOs). Accordingly, we 
suggest that technical standards should be legislatively or judicially 
exempted from the Section 203 termination right. 
Part I gives an introduction to technical standards, and individuals', 
businesses', and manufacturers' increasing reliance on them. Part II 
summarizes the history and procedural requirements of Section 203. 
Part III analyzes the interplay between Section 203 and technical 
standards. Specifically, Part III.B analyzes the implications of joint 
authorship for Section 203 and technical standards, while Part III.C 
explores whether the works-for-hire exception is applicable in the 
standards-development context. Part III.D describes several 
instances in which the derivative works exception could apply to 
EMI Feist Catalog, Inc., No. ll-CV81354, 2011 WL 6359013 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 
2011) (alleging that statutory heirs of the author of the ubiquitous Christmas song 
Santa Clause is Comin' to Town are entitled to terminate a transfer of the copyright to 
a publisher under Section 203 where both the heirs and the author executed the grant). 
18. Ted Johnson, Rock and Recourse: Starting this Year, Artists Are Able to Reclaim 
Rights to Much of Their Music from 35 Years Ago, VARIETY, Apr. 16, 2013, 49, 49 
("The Eagles filed notices of termination to their albums The Long Run, effective on 
Sept. 25, 2014, and Eagles Live, effective on Nov. 8, 2015. Rights are currently held 
by Electra Entertainment and Warner Music Group. Eagles member Don Henley has 
given notice to Geffen Records that he is reclaiming the recording of Boys of Summer, 
effective Oct. 26, 2019, while Devo, Huey Lewis and the News, and Fleetwood Mac 
have filed notices for some of their works, according to records from the U.S. 
Copyright Office. One of the first to file a notice is Kris Kristofferson, who in 2008 
sought termination for Risky Bizness and Spooky Lady's Revenge from Resaca Music 
Publishing Co."). 
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technical standards and considers the role of standards development 
organizations as contributors and publishers. In Part III.E we observe 
that technical standards, and the authors of technical standards, are 
fundamentally different from the traditional works of authorship and 
authors that Section 203 was enacted to protect. We conclude by 
proposing a legislative or judicial exclusion of technical standards 
from Section 203 termination. 
II. OVERVIEW OF TECHNICAL STANDARDS 
Technical standards are documents that define features of products 
and services. 19 Standards can establish minimum requirements for 
product safety, criteria for judging quality, content, environmental 
sustainability and other product features, uniform metrics for 
measurement and assessment, and requirements for product 
interoperability.20 This last category, so-called interoperability 
standards, enable computer networks, electronics, 
telecommunications devices, and other equipment sold by different 
vendors to intemperate in a manner that is virtually invisible to the 
consumer.21 Interoperability standards pervade the technological 
marketplace. They include household names such as Wi-Fi, USB, 
Bluetooth, MP3, DVD, and http, as well as a host of less familiar 
acronyms. According to one recent study, a single laptop computer 
relies on more than 250 different standards for its normal operation.Z2 
The public benefits conferred by technical standards have been 
recognized widely by courts, regulators, and commentators.23 These 
19. See COMM. ON TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS 
DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL 25 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2007) [hereinafter 
PATENT POLICY MANUAL] (providing a general definition of the term "standard"); 
NATL. RES. COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (Keith 
Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill, eds. 2013) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. 
20. See PATENTPOLICYMANUAL, supra note 19, at ix. 
21. See NAS REPORT, supra note 19, at 16. 
22. Brad Biddle et al., How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other Empirical 
Questions), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2010 ITU-T KALEIDOSCOPE ACADEMIC 
CONFERENCE 123 (2010), available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/opb/proc/T-
PROC-KALEI-2010-PDF-E.pdf (identifying 251 technical standards implemented in 
a single laptop computer). 
23. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *9 
(W.D. Wash., Apr. 25, 2013) ("Standards lower costs by increasing product 
manufacturing volume, and they increase price competition by eliminating switching 
costs for consumers who want to switch from products manufactured by one firm to 
those manufactured by another."); U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP 
MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 191 
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benefits make interoperability standards key infrastructural elements 
of the modem technology ecosystem.24 Without them, 
communications, computing, innovation, transportation, finance, and 
manufacturing would be crippled. 25 
Standards, like books, movies, and musical compositions, are, by 
most accounts, works of authorship that fall under· the Copyright 
Act. 26 Most interoperability standards, however, are developed not 
by single authors or firms, but within volunteer-based SDOs that 
operate in particular technical areas.27 Participation in SDOs is 
usually voluntary and open to all interested persons, including 
technology developers, product manufacturers, and industrial 
consumers, as well as occasional governmental and civil society 
representatives.28 The resulting interoperability standards, the 
adoption and use of which are typically not mandated by the SDO, 
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/20ll/03/110307patentreport.pdf 
[hereinafter FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE] ("In many IT industries, 
interoperability among products and their components is critical to developing and 
introducing innovative products that satisfy a range of consumer needs."); Renata B. 
Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address at the 2nd 
Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum: IP, Antitrust and Looking Back on the Last 
Four Years, 16 (Feb. 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/292573.pdf 
("[C]ollaboratively-set industry standards may substantially reduce transaction costs . 
. . . [S]tandards offer our economy great efficiencies and offer consumers and 
businesses new, advanced products .... "). 
24. FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 23, at 191. 
25. Id. 
26. See Why Voluntary Consensus Standards Incorporated by Reference Into Federal 
Government Regulations are Copyright Protected, AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., 
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/News and Publications/Critical 
Issues/Copyright on Standards in Regulations/Copyright on Standards in 
Regulation.pdf(last visited Apr. I, 2014). The copyrightability of technical standards 
is not, however, without controversy. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Questioning 
Copyright in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193, 215 (2007) (arguing that standards 
documents should not be amenable to copyright protection as numbering systems 
under the scenes a fa ire and merger doctrines). For purposes of this discussion, we 
will assume that standards are copyrightable works. 
27. For a general description of the entities and processes involved in the development of 
technical interoperability standards, see PATENT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 19, at x-
xi and Brad Biddle et at., The Expanding Role and Importance of Standards in the 
Information and Communications Technology Industry, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 183-
84 (2012). In this article we do not focus on standards produced by single companies 
such as Adobe's Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft's .doc format. While 
such standards are undeniably important to the market, the copyright termination 
issues discussed herein are generally not salient to such standards. 
28. PATENT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 19, at X. 
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are known as "voluntary consensus standards."29 For example, the 
802.11 (Wi-Fi) wireless networking standards were developed by 
engineers from hundreds of different companies working under the 
auspices of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE).30 The standards that underlie the Internet were developed 
through the loosely-organized Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF)31 and Worldwide Web Consortium (W3C);32 many wireless 
telecommunications standards were developed through groups such 
as the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA)33 and the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).34 
The individual engineers who make technical contributions to an 
SDO and their employers typically assign or license the copyright in 
those contributions to the SDO for purposes of standards 
development, evolution, publication, and dissemination.35 In almost 
all cases, this "transfer" of copyright is made without monetary 
consideration, and neither individual standards developers nor their 
employers (who typically fund their participation in SDO activities) 
receive any financial compensation for this work. 36 The copyright in 
29. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-119 REVISED, FEDERAL 
PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS 
STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES (Feb. 10 1998), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a119 (defining voluntary consensus 
standards). 
30. IEEE Standards Association History, IEEE, 
http://www. ieeeghn.org/wiki/index. php/IEEE _Standards_ Association_ History 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
31. The JETF Standards Process, INTERNET ENG'G TASK FORCE, 
http://www.ietf.org/about/standards-process.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
32. About W3C, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/Consortiurn/ (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
33. About ETSJ, EUR. TELECOMMS. STANDARD INST., http://www.etsi.org/index.php/about 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
34. T!A Standards Development Overview, TELECOMMS. INDUS. Ass'N, 
http://www.tiaonline.org/standards/tia-standards-overview (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
35. See, e.g., IEEE, IEEE POLICIES § 6.3.1(A)(7) (2013), available at 
http://www.ieee.org/documents/ieee_policies.pdf ("Prior to publication by the IEEE, 
all authors or their employers shall transfer to the IEEE in writing any copyright they 
hold for their individual papers. Such transfer shall be a necessary requirement for 
publication, except for material in the public domain or which is reprinted with 
permission from a copyrighted publication."). 
36. See, e.g., id. § 6.3.1(A)(8) ("In return for the transfer of authors' rights, the IEEE shall 
grant authors and their employers' permission to make copies and otherwise reuse the 
material .... "). This no-charge transfer is entirely reasonable in the standards 
context, as participants in standards development projects wish to develop standards 
rapidly and efficiently in order to more quickly develop products that implement the 
standards or to seek patent royalties on such products. 
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the collective work that comprises a standard is often owned by the 
SDO, but individual contributors or, more frequently, their 
employers, retain ownership of the copyrights in their underlying 
contributions.37 Thus, this article explores whether it may be possible 
for individual contributors, or their employers or heirs, to invoke 
Section 203 to terminate copyright grants made with respect to those 
contributions. 
Suppose that a foundational data communications standard 
developed at SDO-X was published in 1978 based largely on the 
technical contributions of John Q. Engineer, an employee of Bigdata 
Corp. Like all participants in SDO-X, John (or Bigdata, if John has 
assigned the copyright to Bigdata under his employment agreement 
or the work-made-for-hire doctrine) has granted SDO-X a perpetual, 
irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free license under the copyright in 
his contributions.38 Since 1978, the standard has continued to evolve 
and is now an integral part of the global telecommunications 
infrastructure. However, notwithstanding the irrevocable license that 
John or Bigdata granted to SDO-X in 1978, beginning in 2013 either 
John or Bigdata (depending on their initial allocation of copyright 
ownership) could conceivably terminate that license under Section 
203.39 
The implications of such a termination could be serious. First, 
SDOs often charge modest fees for the sale and downloading of 
technical standards.40 These fees help to support the administrative 
budgets of SDOs, which typically operate as non-profit corporations 
or membership associations.41 If SDOs were required to fund 
copyright litigation, not to mention royalties to regain terminated 
rights, these costs would most likely be passed through to their 
members and, ultimately, to consumers.42 More importantly, the 
termination of SDO grants to technical contributions would prevent 
37. See infra note 100 and accompanying discussion. 
38. See Rights Contributors Provide to the !ETF Trust, INTERNET ENG'G TASK FORCE 10 
(Scott Bradner & Jorge Contreras eds., Nov. 2008), 
http:/ /tools. ietf.org/pdf!rfc5 3 78. pdf. 
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2006) ("Termination of the grant may be effected at any 
time during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the 
date of execution of the grant .... "). 
40. See Why Charge for Standards?, AM. NAT'L STANDARDS lNST., 
http://www.ansi.org/help/charge_standards.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
41. See id. 
42. Cf Anthony Ciolli, Lowering the Stakes: Toward a Model of Effective Copyright 
Dispute Resolution, 110 W.VA. L. REv. 999, 1010 (2008) (arguing that less copyright 
litigation should result in more savings for consumers). 
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SDOs from further distributing those contributions, and from 
modifying or creating further derivative works of them. The adverse 
impact on enterprises depending on affected standards could be 
significant, as those standards could no longer evolve to 
accommodate future technological developments (e.g., the shift from 
4G to 5G mobile communications, the upgrading of computer 
operating systems, or the introduction of new technologies). 
Given these consequences, why would John, a dedicated engineer 
who originally made a voluntary technical contribution to SDO-X, 
suddenly decide to disrupt the technological infrastructure thirty-five 
years later? There are several possible reasons. First, John may 
simply wish to profit from the widespread adoption and success of 
the standard. It has long been recognized that the holder of 
intellectual property rights covering a technical standard gains the 
ability to charge elevated rents after the standard has been widely 
adopted by the industry.43 This "hold-up" phenomenon is usually 
associated with patents, but could apply equally to a copyright owner 
who had the ability to impede the public utilization of a standard.44 
Thus, while John may have been inclined to make an initial grant to 
SDO-X without charge when the standard was in development and its 
success uncertain, he may now wish to capitalize on the success of 
the standard in the marketplace and renegotiate a license at a higher 
(i.e., non-zero) rate.45 Moreover, after thirty-five years, it is possible 
that John is deceased and John's heirs may feel no loyalty to SDO-X 
and simply wish to maximize the value of his estate's assets. They 
may have no hesitation in terminating license grants that he made to 
SDO-X under Section 203 in the hope of renegotiating for increased 
compensation. 46 
43. See, e.g., FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 23, at 5 ("Patent hold-up can 
overcompensate patentees, raise prices to consumers who lose the benefits of 
competition among technologies, and deter innovation by manufacturers facing the 
risk of hold-up."); Joseph Farrell et a!., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 
ANTITRUST L. J. 603, 609 (2007). 
44. See Andrea Pacelli, Note, Who Owns the Key to the Vault? Hold-up, Lock-out, and 
Other Copyright Strategies, 18 FORDHAM lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1229, 
1239-40 (2008). Copyright has typically not factored into the hold-up analysis due to 
the perpetual, irrevocable license grants that are usually made by contributors to 
technical standards. Section 203 has the potential to alter this balance. 
45. Given that most SDOs are thinly-staffed non-profit entities, the financial burden of 
such royalty demands would likely fall on other implementers of the standard (product 
vendors), and eventually be passed through to consumers. 
46. This article will discuss the ability of corporate "authors," such as Bigdata, to exercise 
Section 203 termination rights. See infra Part II. 
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Typically standards are unburdened by the copyright royalty 
obligations that characterize musical compositions, books, and other 
works of authorship. In our experience, contributors to standards 
development projects, whether individual engineers or their 
employers, generally have no expectation of financial remuneration 
from the grant of a copyright license to the SDO. And the 
termination of customary royalty-free copyright licenses granted by 
contributors to SDOs could have a significant disruptive effect on the 
standardization process and impose a substantial new cost on 
industries that are standards-dependent (a cost most likely to be 
passed on to consumers). 
In a recent article, Professor Timothy Armstrong observes, in a 
similar vein, that Section 203 terminations could adversely affect 
open source code software by enabling individual software 
developers to terminate their copyright grants to open source projects, 
thereby disrupting the many downstream uses of that software.47 
Professor Armstrong expresses concern that Section 203 terminations 
could adversely impact important open source projects, such as Linux 
and Wikipedia, and "chill the vibrant creative environment that 
presently surrounds the development and use of open-content 
works."48 His concern is well-founded. However, open source 
software is a relatively recent development.49 The first version of the 
first widely used open source code license, the GNU General Public 
License (GPL), was originally published in 1989.50 Thus, the first 
Section 203 termination of a GPL license could not occur until 2024, 
nearly a decade from now. The far more common GPL v.2 was 
released in 1991, meaning that no GPL v.2 license could be 
47. Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses 
and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359,405-09 (2010); 
see also Jon L. Phelps, Copy/eft Termination: Will the Termination Provision of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 Undermine the Free Software Foundation's General Public 
License?, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 261-62 (noting that if open source code licenses are 
terminable under Section 203, the open source software movement could be severely 
impacted and proposing utilizing the Section 117 safe harbor for software copies to 
avoid termination problems while permitting continued open source code 
development). 
48. Armstrong, supra note 47, at 363. 
49. See Bruce Perens, Open Source Definition, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN 
SOURCE REVOLUTION 171, 172 (Chris DiBona eta!. eds, 1999). 
50. GNU General Public License Version 1, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., INC., (Feb. 1989), 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-l.O.txt. The more popular General Public License 
Version 2.0 was released in 1991. GNU General Public License Version 2, FREE 
SoFTWARE FOUND., INC., (June 1991 ), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html. 
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terminated until 2026, at the earliest. 51 In the realm of standards, 
however, the risk of termination exists today.52 Many technical 
standards that were first published in 1978 are still in use. 53 
Moreover, the number of standards produced each year has grown 
steadily,54 and with each year that passes the number of standards 
potentially subject to Section 203 termination will increase. 
III. HISTORY AND ELEMENTS OF SECTION 203 
The Copyright Act of 1909 employed a two-term protection 
scheme under which authors enjoyed twenty-eight years of copyright 
protection with the option to renew for a second twenty-eight year 
term. 55 Only the author or his heirs had the right to renew the 
copyright, giving them a second opportunity to benefit from the 
success of a copyrighted work. 56 The Congressional record also 
indicates that the renewal right was intended to be inalienable, so as 
to vest it exclusively in authors and their heirs. 57 
51. See GNU General Public License Version 2, supra note 50. 
52. See Phelps, supra note 47, at 265. 
53. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 1 (adopted Sept. 18, 1978); ISO 5754:1978 Sintered 
Metal Materials, Excluding Hardmetals - Unnotched Impact Test Piece, INT'L ORG. 
FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=11880 (last visited Apr. 1, 
2014) (adopted 1978); ISO 172:1978 Plastics- Phenol-formaldehyde Mouldings-
Detection of Free Ammonia, lNT'L 0RG. FOR STANDARDS, 
http:/ /www.iso.org/iso/catalogue _ detail.htm?csnumber-4006 (last visited Apr. 1, 
2014) (adopted 1978); NFPA 72£: Standard for Automatic Fire Detectors- Other 
Prior Editions, NAT'L FIRE PROT. ASS'N, ... 
http://www .nfpa.org/catalog/product.asp?pid=NFP A 72EARCHIV &cookie%5Ftest= 1 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (adopted May 18, 1978). 
54. See /SO: Standards Development, lNT'L 0RG. FOR STANDARDS, 
http://www.iso.org/iso!home/standards _ development.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 20 14). 
55. Pub. L. No. 349, ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (1909). The 1790 Act 
afforded copyright protection for an initial term of fourteen years with the right to 
renew for another fourteen years. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § I, 1 Stat. 124, 124 
(1790) (repealed 1802). The 1831 Act doubled the length of both the initial and 
renewal terms to twenty-eight years. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 
436, 436, 439 (1831 ). 
56. The House Report accompanying the 1909 Act states: "It not infrequently happens 
that the author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small 
sum. If the work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of twenty-
eight years, your committee felt it should be the exclusive right of the author to take 
the renewal term, and the law should be framed as is the existing law, so that he could 
not be deprived of that right." H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 14 (1909). 
57. !d.; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 497 (2001) (reciting the 
characterization of the termination right as "inalienable"); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 
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Despite these provisions, in 1943 the U.S. Supreme Court refused 
to recognize the inalienability of a copyright renewal interest. 58 In 
Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M Witmark & Sons, the composer of the 
song When Irish Eyes Are Smiling transferred "all copyrights and 
[renewal rights]" in the song to the publishing firm M. Witmark & 
Sons. 59 After twenty-eight years, both the composer and Witmark 
independently applied for renewal with the Copyright Office, and the 
composer assigned his renewal interest to another publisher, Fred 
Fisher Music Co.6° Fisher subsequently began selling copies of the 
song, and Witmark filed suit to enjoin Fisher's sales based on the 
composer's earlier assignment of the renewal right to Witmark.61 The 
Court upheld the initial assignment, refusing to recognize the renewal 
right as inalienable because the statute did not explicitly impose such 
a restriction. 62 This decision, arguably in conflict with the legislative 
intent, controlled the copyright-renewal landscape for the next thirty-
five years.63 
The 1976 Copyright Act amendments represented the culmination 
of fifteen years of legislative debate.64 Spurred in large part by a 
desire to overturn Fisher, the Copyright Office in 1961 submitted a 
comprehensive study to Congress suggesting, among other things, 
that the original Congressional intent "would seem to require that the 
207, 229-30 (1990) (characterizing the termination right as "inalienable" in spite of 
any contract that purportedly transfers the right to the grantee). 
58. See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 659 (1943); see also 
Menell & Nimmer, supra note 8, at 804-06 (discussing Fred Fisher Music Co., and 
its legislative aftermath). 
59. Fred Fisher Music Co., 318 U.S. at 645. 
60. Jd. at 646. 
61. Jd. 
62. I d. at 655-56 ("If Congress ... had any intention of altering what theretofore had not 
been questioned, namely, that there were no statutory restraints upon the assignment 
by authors of their renewal rights, it is almost certain that such purpose would have 
been manifested."). 
63. Notably in Fisher, the author survived to renew. See id. at 645-46. If an author died 
prior to the renewal date, the assignment of the renewal term (treated as an 
expectancy/contingent assignment) was void. The renewal right did not belong to the 
decedent, but rather to the statutory heir. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, 
Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 376 (1960). 
64. Beginning in 1961, representatives of a wide range of interests affected by the 
copyright law participated in "numerous meetings and discussions under the auspices 
of the Copyright Office." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660. 
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renewal right be made unassignable in advance. "65 The Draft 
Committee agreed and incorporated the report's suggestions in the 
first draft of the revised copyright bil1.66 Specifically, the Draft 
Committee articulated the concept of inalienability by providing that 
"termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any 
agreement to the contrary."67 Although Congress would not enact the 
final version of the bill until 1976, the underlying rationale that the 
reversionary interest must be inalienable in order to "safeguard[] 
authors against unremunerative transfers" consistently reappeared 
throughout debates and other legislative reports. 68 Further, Congress 
explained the need for a restraint on alienation of the renewal right as 
stemming from "the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting 
in part from the impossibility of determining the work's value until it 
has been exploited."69 
With this purpose in mind, Congress crafted statutory language to 
effectuate this underlying rationale.70 As a preliminary matter, it 
eliminated the two-term renewal system and replaced it with a longer, 
unitary copyright term in order to conform with the requirements of 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works. 71 After adopting a unitary term of the author's life plus fifty 
years, 72 the concept of recapturing renewal rights became moot. 
65. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 53-54 (Comm. 
Print 1961 ). 
66. See 1964 Revision Bill, H.R. 11947, 88th Cong. §§ 16(a), 22(c) (1964) (codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c) (1976)). 
67. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (1976). 
68. S. REP. No. 94-473, at 108 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47. 
69. S. REP. No. 94-473, at 108; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47; see also Mills Music, Inc. v. 
Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985) (explaining that "the concept of a termination 
right itselq] [was] obviously intended to make the rewards for the creativity of 
authors more substantial .... [and] expressly intended to relieve authors of the 
consequences of ill-advised and unremunerative grants that had been made before the 
author had a fair opportunity to appreciate the true value of his work product.") 
(emphasis added). 
70. SeeS. REP. No. 94-473, at 108. 
71. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 135 ("[T]he disparity in the duration of copyright [between 
the U.S. and Berne Convention countries] has provoked considerable resentment and 
some proposals for retaliatory legislation .... The need to conform the duration of 
U.S. copyright to that prevalent throughout the rest of the world is increasingly 
pressing in order to provide certainty and simplicity in international business 
dealings."). 
72. In 1998, Congress increased the duration of the copyright term by twenty years, 
bringing the total term to the author's life plus seventy years. See Sonny Bono 
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Congress thus implemented the termination provision of Section 203 
to provide similar protection during the life of the unitary copyright 
term.73 Congress eventually created a window, between thirty-five 
and forty years after a grant is made/4 during which time the author 
can terminate the transfer of any copyright (whether by express grant 
or exclusive or non-exclusive license). 75 The timing applicable to a 
hypothetical post-1978 copyright grant would thus work as shown in 
Table 1 below: 
T bl 1 T' . a e - 1mmg_o fS ect10n 203 T ermmatwn 
Event Date 
Date of grant June 15, 1980 
Earliest possible date to serve notice of termination June 15, 2005 
(10 years before earliest possible termination date) 
Earliest possible date of termination June 15, 2015 
(35 years after grant) 
Latest possible date to serve notice of termination June 15, 2018 
_(2 _years before latest _Q_ossible termination date) 
Latest possible date of termination June 15, 2020 
( 40 years after grant) 
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, Ill Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301, 304 (2006)). 
73. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (implementing the termination right as a "practical 
compromise that will further the objectives of the copyright law while recognizing the 
problems and legitimate needs of all interests involved."). 
74. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., REP. OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 75 (Comm. 
Print 1965) ("The basic 35-year figure represents a compromise which, we believe, is 
short enough to be of benefit to authors and long enough to avoid unfairness to 
publishers and other users."). 
75. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006). For works created prior to 1978, Section 304(c) allows the 
author to terminate any grant of the renewal right between fifty-six and sixty-one 
years after the date the copyright was secured. However, because it is extremely rare 
for the authors of contributions to technical standards to register or renew their 
copyrights in such contributions, Section 304(c) is largely inapplicable to this 
discussion. See generally Menell & Nimmer, supra note 8 (discussing current 
controversy regarding Section 304 termination). 
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It is important to note that only the author of a work (or his heirs) is 
entitled to exercise the right of termination under Section 203.76 
Thus, subsequent transferees and assignees of the author's rights do 
not have standing to terminate under Section 203, nor, arguably, do 
corporate successors in interest to a corporate author. 77 
IV. SECTION 203 TERMINATION AND TECHNICAL 
STANDARDS 
A. Technical Standards and Copyright 
Interoperability standards for technology products typically result 
from collaboration among technical experts who are full-time 
employees of corporations, government agencies, and research 
institutions having an interest in the standardized technology.78 
These individuals may either submit a complete document to an SDO 
for consideration as a standard, or interact with other SDO 
participants to write a joint document. 79 In either case, such 
contributions are generally modified and evolved by one or more 
working groups within the SDO as they progress along the "standards 
track," until such time as they are approved by the requisite body 
within the SD0.80 To assist in the standards development process, 
the SDO often employs administrative staff. 81 These SDO employees 
are usually non-technical personnel who assist with document 
76. /d. § 203(a). 
77. See id. 
78. See Andrew Updegrove, Forming a Successful Consortium - Part I - Business 
Considerations, CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG, 
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/formingl.php (last visited Apr. I, 
2014). 
79. See Tyler R.T. Wolf, Note, Existing in a Legal Limbo: The Precarious Legal Position 
of Standards-Development Organizations, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 807, 813-15 
(2008); see also Andrew Updegrove, Creating a Standard Setting Organization 
Technical Process,§ 4.1, CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG, 
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/creating.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
80. See, e.g., How Are Standards Made?, IEEE, 
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/process.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
81. See Updegrove, Creating a Standard Setting Organization Technical Process, supra 
note 79. 
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formatting and editing.82 SDO employees do not generally contribute 
technical content to standards.83 
SDOs vary considerably in their structure, policies, and 
objectives.84 As noted in Part I of this article, many SDOs are 
organized as non-profit corporations or membership associations.85 
Accordingly, these SDOs have corporate charters and bylaws that 
outline the scope and composition of the board, voting practices, and 
duties of corporate officers and board members.86 Additionally, 
many of these SDOs have membership agreements that dictate terms 
and conditions with which a member must comply in order to 
participate in the standards development process. Often included in 
such charters, bylaws, policies, and agreements are the terms under 
which the participant must license textual contributions to the SDO. 87 
The typical license is structured as a perpetual, nonexclusive license 
granting all rights under the copyright in the contribution to the 
SD0.88 These licenses are almost always granted to the SDO without 
any pecuniary compensation. 89 
B. Technical Standards as Joint Works 
One of the key provisions of Section 203 addresses the way in 
which joint authors of a single copyrighted work can terminate a 
prior transfer of that joint work.90 The Copyright Act defines "joint 
work" as "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention 
82. See id. 
83. See id. § 4.2.1. 
84. Brad Biddle et al., The Expanding Role and Importance of Standards in the 
Information and Communications Technology Industry, supra note 27, at 180. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. 
87. For a discussion of the enforceability of such SDO commitments in the patent 
licensing context, see Jorge L. Contreras, Market Reliance and Patent Pledges _ 
UTAH L. REv. (2015, forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309023 and Mark A. Lemley, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REv. 
1889, 1925 (2002). 
88. See Lemley, supra note 87, at 1949. 
89. See id. 
90. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006). See Daniel Gould, Time's Up: Copyright Termination, 
Work-for-Hire and the Recording Industry, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 91 (2007) 
(discussing impact of joint authorship in the recording industry on statutory 
termination rights); Melville B. Nimmer, Termination of Transfers under the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 947, 963--67 (1977) (describing 
requirements for termination by joint authors). 
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that their contribution be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole."91 Joint authors must share a common 
design and each author must contribute at least a minimal amount of 
creative expression beyond mere editorial revisions.92 Joint authors 
each own an undivided interest in the entire joint work, enabling each 
joint author to grant nonexclusive licenses to third parties, provided 
the licensor accounts for profits to his joint authors.93 Section 203 
requires that a majority of the authors who executed a grant in a joint 
work act together to terminate that grant.94 Thus, to the extent that a 
standard is considered a joint work, a single author (or his employer 
or heirs) acting alone could not terminate the grant of rights under 
Section 203.95 
1. Joint or Collective? 
A joint work, however, should not be confused with a collective 
work, which comprises multiple distinct works by different authors 
combined into a single body, such as an anthology.96 Collective 
works lack the merger and unity requirements of joint works and 
represent instead an aggregation of independent works into a single 
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). Notably, the Act does not explicitly 
define "joint author." However, as Professor Nimmer points out, this definition 
practically serves as establishing the circumstances under which joint authors create a 
joint work, not the parameters for joint ownership. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.0 I (Sept. 20 13). 
92. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F .2d 500, 504, 509 (2d. Cir. 1991) (noting that "helpful 
advice" is insufficient to establish joint authorship, and expounding the idea that 
"[ c ]are must be taken to ensure that the true collaborators in the creative process are 
accorded the perquisites of co-authorship and to guard against the risk that a sole 
author is denied exclusive authorship status simply because another person rendered 
some form of assistance"). 
93. !d. at 505; Erikson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 
Weinstein v. Univ. of III., 811 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7th Cir. 1987)) ("[E)ach author as co-
owner has the right to use or to license the use of the work, subject to an accounting to 
the other co-owners for any profits."). 
94. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(l) (2006). Section 203(a)(2) addresses the scenario in which one 
or more joint authors have died, imposing the same majority requirement as Section 
203(a)(l) but permitting statutory survivors to work as a "unit" in order to reach the 
necessary 51% mark. !d.§ 203(a)(1)--(2). 
95. !d. § 203(a)(l ). 
96. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (defining "collective work" as "a work, 
such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of 
contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are 
assembled into a collective whole."). 
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collection.97 Though the individual authors of contributions to the 
collective work retain ownership of the copyrights in their 
contributions (absent contractual terms to the contrary), a separate 
copyright exists in the collective work itself, which is owned by the 
compiler (usually the editor or publisher of the collective work).98 
Though Section 203 requires that the majority of joint authors of a 
work act together in order to terminate a copyright grant made with 
respect to their joint work, no such requirement exists for collective 
works.99 Thus, an individual contributor to a collective work could 
independently terminate a grant with respect to his individual 
contribution to the collection. This distinction makes it important to 
determine whether technical standards should be classified as joint 
works or collective works for purposes of Section 203. 
Some SDOs seek to treat finalized standards documents as 
collective works and claim ownership of the copyright in those 
collective works, while acknowledging that individual contributors 
retain copyright in their individual contributions. 100 If a standard is 
considered a collective work, then Section 203 would permit an 
author, or his heirs, to terminate a license to his individual 
contribution to the collection, potentially rendering the standard 
incoherent. 
2. Joint Authorship of Standards. 
While it is possible that in some cases standards may represent 
compilations of individual contributions, the typical standards-
development process appears far more likely to result in joint works. 
Standards are often written or substantially reviewed by committee, 
and each committee member who meaningfully participates in the 
drafting or revision of a standard likely has a claim as a joint 
97. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5736 (explaining that in contrast to a collective work, "a work is 'joint' ifthe authors 
collaborated with each other, or if each of the authors prepared his or her contribution 
with the knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the contributions of 
other authors as 'inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."') (emphasis 
added). For a discussion of the confusion some courts have had over whether the 
disjunctive "or" actually creates two distinct categories of joint works, see WILLIAM F. 
PATRY, 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT§ 5.4 (2011). 
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2006). 
99. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(l). 
100. See, e.g., Rights Contributors Provide to the IETF Trust, supra note 38, § 5.9 
("Subject to each Contributor's (or its sponsor's) ownership of its underlying 
Contributions ... each Contributor hereby acknowledges that the copyright in any 
RFC in which such Contribution is included ... shall be owned by the IETF Trust."). 
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author. 101 The key to joint authorship is intent, and while the parties 
need not work together physically or have an express collaboration 
agreement, they must have a common design to merge their 
contributions into an inseparable, unitary work. 102 Joint authorship 
status, however, depends on the level of contribution by an individual 
committee member. 103 One who attends committee meetings, for 
example, but does not actually participate in writing or revising the 
standard may have difficulty proving the required level of contributed 
expression.104 On the other hand, one who can prove contribution 
through meeting notes, e-mail exchanges, or phone records will have 
a much stronger claim.105 
Several cases have recognized joint authorship in standards 
developed by committee. In American Dental Ass 'n v. Delta Dental 
Plans Ass 'n, 106 the Seventh Circuit overruled an Illinois District 
Court's holding that the ADA's billing guidelines, the "Code on 
Dental Procedures and Nomenclature," was not copyrightable 
because it was created by a committee. 107 The Seventh Circuit 
rejected the lower court's reasoning that committees are categorically 
incapable of achieving the requisite level of creativity to qualify the 
101. It is unlikely, however, that editorial or formatting contributions by an SDO employee 
would rise to the level of expressive contribution necessary to qualify the SDO as a 
joint author of the underlying standard, though some "thin" copyright may exist in 
these superficial contributions. 
102. 17U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
103. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d. Cir. 1991) ("It seems more consistent with 
the spirit of copyright law to oblige all joint authors to make copyrightable 
contributions, leaving those with non-copyrightable contributions to protect their 
rights through contract."). Some scholars and courts have taken the position that 
anything more than a de minimis contribution is sufficient to qualify for joint 
authorship status, reasoning that the lower threshold incentivizes collaboration, 
rewards authors, and permits contracts designed to circumvent a default joint 
authorship rule through assignment of rights or work for hire agreements. See 
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658-61 (7th Cir. 2004). However, some courts 
have determined that the mere contribution of independently copyrightable expression 
is still insufficient to establish joint authorship. See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 
1227, 1232-34 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that control, in addition to intent, is central to a 
determination of joint authorship). 
104. See Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 743, 767-68 (D.P.R. 1995) 
(explaining that mere regular attendance at meetings with the author does not raise 
one's level of contribution to that of a joint author). 
105. See id. at 764-65 (describing the spectrum of contribution required to establish 
authorship status). 
106. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997). 
107. !d. at 977-78. 
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work as copyrightable. 108 The court went on to explain that 
committees are, in fact, capable of original authorship and therefore 
entitled to copyright protection, noting that "[b ]lood is shed in the 
ADA's committees about which [billing] description is preferable."109 
The Court of Federal Claims addressed similar arguments in 
Herbert v. United States."0 In Herbert, a committee of the National 
Academy of Sciences developed a report entitled 1Oth Recommended 
Dietary Allowances.'" The committee held regular meetings and 
reviewed numerous drafts "line-by-line."112 Though the committee 
members did not have final editorial control over the report, the court 
held that the entire committee as a whole, and not just the individual 
authors, had control over the draft manuscript; and therefore the 
report qualified as a joint work. 113 Accordingly, each committee 
member had a valid claim as a joint author. 114 
If a copyright grant to the SDO was made collectively by joint 
authors, then termination under Section 203 would require the action 
of a majority of the joint authors or their heirs."5 Given the long 
periods required between the grant and termination (thirty-five to 
forty years), it will probably be difficult for multiple authors or heirs 
to coordinate the exercise of termination rights under Section 203, 
particularly since individuals may be deceased and their employers 
may be defunct, acquired, or substantially reorganized since initial 
grants were made. " 6 Moreover, the fact that initial grants to SDOs 
are without compensation means that such grants will generally not 
be recorded in corporate books of account, tracked for royalty 
purposes or, in many cases, retained in written form by the author. 117 
Thus, if technical standards are viewed as joint works in which 
copyright grants have been made collectively by the contributors, the 
likelihood of successful Section 203 termination will probably be 
low. 
108. !d. at 978-79. 
109. !d. at 979. 
110. Herbert v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 299, 306--09 (Fed. Cl. 1996). 
Ill. !d. at 302. 
112. !d. at 309. 
113. !d. 
114. /d.at310. 
115. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(l) (2006). 
116. !d. § 203(a)(3). 
117. See Why Voluntary Consensus Standards Incorporated by Reference Into Federal 
Government Regulations are Copyright Protected, supra note 26, at 3. 
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3. Individual Grants in Joint Works. 
But even assuming that a committee-drafted technical standard is, 
in fact, a joint work, it is not necessarily the case that the contributors 
have jointly granted rights to the SDO for purposes of Section 203. 
Though the statute contemplates a scenario, common in the music 
and literary worlds, in which joint authors jointly grant rights to a 
publisher or producer, this approach is generally not used in the 
standards context. 118 Rather, each individual author or firm typically 
grants a license to the SDO with respect to its contributions on an 
individual basis. 119 The co-authors of a standard seldom execute a 
joint assignment or license. 120 
Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis121 illustrates how a court may view 
attempts to terminate by a single author of a joint work. Willis, the 
original lead singer of the Village People, sought to terminate his 
post-1977 grants of thirty-three musical compositions to Can't Stop 
Music (CSM), the exclusive United States sub-publisher of 
compositions owned by Scorpio Music. 122 Copyright registrations for 
the songs listed Willis as one of several writers. 123 In a series of 
separate agreements between 1977 and 1979, however, Willis 
independently transferred his copyright interest in the songs to 
CSM-who in tum assigned these rights to Scorpio---in exchange for 
royalties of 12% to 20%. 124 In January 2011, Willis served on CSM 
and Scorpio a notice of termination under Section 203 for all thirty-
three songs, and Scorpio challenged the termination's validity. 125 
Scorpio's main argument was that in order to effect a valid 
termination under Section 203, a majority of all authors who 
transferred their interests in the joint work (whether separately or in a 
single transaction) must join the termination. 126 Accordingly, Scorpio 
argued that Willis' termination notice was invalid because Willis was 
the only author named. 127 However, the court reasoned that Willis 
118. See Keith Barritt, Copyright Ownership of Voluntary Consensus Standards, FISH & 
RICHARDSON (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.fr.com/Copyright-Ownership-of-
Voluntary-Consensus-Standards/. 
119. See id. 
120. See id. 
121. Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11cv1557 BTM(RBB), 2012 WL 1598043, at *1 




125. !d. at *1, *5. 
126. !d. at *I. 
127. !d. 
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was the sole party to his own contracts with CSM-his co-authors 
had entered into separate agreements-and his termination notice was 
valid based on the clear statutory allowance that "[i]n the case of a 
grant executed by one author, termination of the grant may be 
effected by that author."128 The court therefore concluded that a 
"joint author who separately transfers his copyright interest may 
unilaterally terminate that grant. " 129 
If a contributor's grant of his interest in a joint work was 
individually made to an SDO then, under the reasoning of Scorpio, it 
is likely that the individual contributor may terminate his individual 
grant in the joint work under Section 203. This situation could result 
in more terminations than the scenario described in Part III.B.2 
above, in which co-authors of a joint work jointly make a grant to the 
SDO, requiring a majority of their number to effect a termination 
under Section 203. But even this result may not be catastrophic to 
SDOs, as any joint author has the right to grant the SDO a license 
under the joint copyright. 130 Thus, if other non-terminating joint 
authors continue to license the SDO, a single joint author's 
termination would have no effect. 
C. The Works-Made-for-Hire Exception 
The work-made-for-hire exception is arguably the most 
important and least clear element of the Section 203 termination 
right. The Section expressly applies to "any work other than a work 
made for hire."131 Thus, to the extent that a work can be 
characterized as a work-made-for-hire, it will not be subject to the 
termination provisions of Section 203. 132 
128. !d. at * 1-2. 
129. !d. at *2, *4. 
130. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
131. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006) (emphasis added). A similar exclusion for works made for 
hire appears in Section 304 governing termination of pre-1978 grants or transfers. 17 
U.S.C. § 304(c}-(d) (2006). 
132. See id. § 203(a); see also, Emily Burrows, Termination of Sound Recording 
Copyrights & the Potential Unconscionability of Work for Hire Clauses, 30 REv. 
LITIG. 101 (2010) (questioning work-for-hire clauses in the recording industry); 
Michael H. Davis, The Screenwriter's Indestructible Right to Terminate Her 
Assignment of Copyright Once a Story is "Pitched, " A Studio Can Never Obtain All 
Copyrights in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93 (2000) (discussing the 
work-made-for-hire doctrine and Section 203 termination in the context of studio 
pitches); John Molinaro, Who Owns Captain America? Contested Authorship, Work-
for-Hire, and Termination Rights under the Copyright Act of 1976, 21 GA. ST. U. L. 
REv. 565 (2004) (discussing the dispute over whether the author of the Captain 
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Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a "work made for hire" 
as: "(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or 
her employment,"133 or "(2) a work specially ordered or 
commissioned" and falling into one of nine specific categories. 134 
When a work-made-for-hire is created, the employer is automatically 
deemed to be the "author" of the work, and the employee never 
obtains ownership of any copyright interest. 135 A key rationale 
behind the exclusion of works-made-for-hire from Section 203 was to 
assure employers that works created by their employees would not 
subsequently be recaptured. 136 In effect, the statute recognizes that an 
America comics created them as a work-made-for-hire and the impact of that 
determination on his termination rights under Section 203). 
133. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). The Supreme Court addressed the question 
whether an independent contractor can constitute an "employee" for purposes of the 
work-made-for-hire doctrine in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 
U.S. 730, 739-42 (1989). In Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Court found 
that a contractor engaged by the city to create a sculpture was not an employee, even 
though the city directed the contractor's work to ensure the sculpture met their 
specifications. The Court instead relied on a number of factors weighing in favor of 
finding that the contractor was independent, such as the skilled nature of the work, the 
contractor's independent ownership of tools and studio space, the one-time nature of 
this specific project, and the relatively short time period of the work. /d. at 752-53. 
134. 17 U.S.C. § 101. More specifically as to the second prong, the work must be 
"specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as 
part of a picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, 
as a compilation, as an 'instructional text', as a test, as answer material for a test, or as 
an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the 
work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing 
sentence, a 'supplementary work' is a work prepared for publication as a secondary 
adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, 
illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other 
work, such as forewords, afterwords, illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, 
musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and 
indexes, and an 'instructional text' is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for 
publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities." Id. 
135. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). Courts have held that a corporate entity, though incapable of 
exercising intellect, can be a "person" and fall within the scope of the term "author" 
under the copyright laws. Vitaphone Corp. v. Hutchinson Amusement Co., 28 F. 
Supp. 526, 529 (D. Mass. 1939) (rejecting the argument that a movie distribution 
company cannot be an author "because it is not capable of exercising intellectual 
labor, nor does it possess the mental endowment necessary to produce photoplays"); 
see also Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Palmer Jewelry Mfg. Co., 171 F. Supp. 603, 605-06 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (finding that a corporation may be a "proprietor" through the actions 
of its employees and can therefore fall within the scope of "author or proprietor of any 
work"). 
136. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659, 
5739-40 (providing that Section 203 should include a provision which protects 
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employee's wages should be sufficient compensation for any works 
produced within the scope of employment, and does not allow the 
employee or his heirs to terminate such rights years later in the hope 
of receiving additional compensation. 137 Thus, even if an employee 
produced a work while earning the minimum wage, and even if that 
work later became wildly successful and earned the employer 
enormous profits, the employee would have no right under Section 
203 to terminate the assignment and renegotiate for greater 
remuneration. The employer is considered the work's author from 
the moment it is created and Section 203 simply does not apply. 138 
Despite the seemingly straightforward statutory language and 
underlying rationale, the Section 203 exclusion of works-made-for-
hire leaves open several questions. Most importantly, does the 
Section 203 exclusion apply to (1) any work that is a work-made-for-
hire for the grantee (that is, the rights-holder against which the 203 
termination right is exercised), or (2) any work that is a work-made-
for-hire at all? This distinction is critical. Scenario (1) appears to 
have been contemplated by Congress when it sought to protect 
employers from subsequent terminations by their employees. 139 
Scenario ( 1) is illustrated in Figure 1: 
Figure 1- Work-made-for-hire for Grantee (No Termination) 
authors against unremunerative transfers due to the "unequal bargaining position of 
authors"). See id. at 121 ("[t]he [presumption] that initial ownership rights vest in the 
employer for hire is well established in American copyright law"). 
137. 17U.S.C.§203(2006). 
138. Id. 
139. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 127. 
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In Scenario (1 ), the application of the Section 203 exclusion is 
straightforward. An employee creates a script for her employer (a 
television producer). The script is within the scope of her 
employment and thus constitutes a work-made-for-hire. Under 
Section 203, the employee script writer is not permitted to terminate 
the transfer of copyright to her employer. 140 
Scenario (2), however, is also included within the literal wording of 
Section 203. It is illustrated by Figure 2: 
Figure 2- Work-made-for-hire- Not for Grantee (terminable) 
In Scenario 2, the employee produces the same script for her 
employer, a producer. It is a work-made-for-hire, and the employee 
has no right to terminate her transfer under Section 203. However, 
sometime after receiving the script, the employer licenses it to a 
studio. Can the employer, which is deemed to be the author of the 
script under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, terminate the license to 
the studio under Section 203? Ordinarily, one might think this 
termination would be possible, as the script was not made by an 
employee of the studio (i.e., it was not a work-made-for-hire for the 
grantee (the studio). However, the script was a work-made-for-hire 
for the producer. Under Section 203, does the fact that a work was 
originally a work-made-for-hire forever brand it as a work-made-for-
hire as to which Section 203 does not apply? Or is Section 203 
intended to exclude from termination only works-made-for-hire for 
the grantee? This question, which is highly relevant to the standards 
140. 17 U.S.C § 203; see H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 125 (providing that "the right of 
termination would not apply to 'works made for hire'"); see also Richard D. Palmieri, 
Who's the Author? A Bright-Line Rule for Specially Commissioned Works Made for 
Hire, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 1175, 1176-77 (2012) ("U.S. copyright law grants to an 
author of a work other than a work made for hire a right to terminate any transfers 
(except testamentary transfers) she has made of her copyright, with the result being 
that ownership of the copyright reverts to the author of the work. This termination 
right is a powerful one; it is inalienable and the author retains the right to terminate 
transfers 'not withstanding any agreement to the contrary."'). 
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development context, appears to be unanswered by the legislative 
history of Section 203 as well as the case law. 
The typical standards-development arrangement (engineer -
employer - SDO) resembles the three-party example illustrated in 
Figure 2 (screen writer - producer - studio ). 141 An individual 
engineer creates a contribution to a standard within the scope of his 
employment, that contribution is treated as a work-made-for-hire, and 
his employer is therefore recognized as the contribution's author. 
The employer then grants the SDO a license to that contribution. The 
contribution was made by the engineer for his e~loyer, but it is 
clearly not a work-made-for-hire for the SD0. 14 Is the initial 
character of the contribution as a work-made-for-hire enough to 
exempt the contribution from the termination right under Section 
203? 
As noted, the statute is ambiguous in this regard. However, we 
believe that the policy considerations leading to the enactment of 
Section 203 militate against allowing a corporate author to terminate 
a copyright grant with respect to works made by its employees. 
There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, the plain 
language of the statute excludes all works-made-for-hire from the 
scope of Section 203. 143 Nothing in the legislative history indicates 
that any particular varieties of works-made-for-hire should be 
immune from this exclusion. 144 Second, corporate authors were 
clearly not the class of persons that Section 203 sought to protect. 145 
As demonstrated in its legislative history, Section 203 was intended 
to benefit relatively unknown authors who sold significant works to 
far more powerful publishers and thereby failed to reap the financial 
benefits of their work. 146 Section 203 was not intended to give 
corporations the right to terminate commercial licensing 
141. See Biddle eta!., The Expanding Role and Importance of Standards in the Information 
and Communications Technology Industry, supra note 27, at 192 (discussing a three-
party arrangement in an informal contractual-based technical collaboration). 
142. The SDO neither employs engineers nor commissions work from them in the statutory 
sense, as the SDO pays nothing for the work and does not specify the parameters of 
the work, as the commissioner of a work typically would. And even if work could be 
construed as commissioned, technical standards do not fall into one of the nine 
statutory categories under which commissioned works will be deemed works-made-
for-hire. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
143. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
144. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
145. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659, 5739-
40. 
146. /d. 
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arran9ements simply because their employees created the works at 
issue. 47 In fact, the statutory mention of authors' deaths and heirs, 
and the lack of any mention of corporate authors, indicates that 
Section 203 was intended to apply to individuals, and not to corporate 
"persons."148 
Finally, if employees themselves are not permitted to take 
advantage of the termination right under Section 203 after their 
works-made-for-hire are transferred to their employers, employers 
should not be permitted to protect their own financial interests by 
terminating downstream license grants with respect to those very 
employee-created works. 149 Employers were intended to be protected 
by the works-made-for-hire exception under Section 203, but only to 
prevent subse~uent terminations by employees long after works had 
been created. 1 The employer's protection should not be doubled by 
also enabling it to exercise its own termination right under Section 
203 with respect to downstream grants. Accordingly, we believe that 
the works-made-for-hire exclusion of Section 203 should prevent 
employers from terminating copyright grants in their employees' 
contributions to technical standards. 
D. The Derivative Works Exception 
Another key exception of Section 203 is a provision permitting 
grantees to continue to exploit derivative works even after the grant 
in an underlying work is terminated. 151 However, this exception does 
not authorize the creation of new derivative works based on the 
original contribution after the grant has been terminated. 152 Thus, the 
right to exploit existing derivative works created under the authority 
of a grant is non-terminable, while the right to create· new derivative 
works is terminable. 153 
Section 101 of the Copyright Act offers only a vague definition of a 
derivative work: a work that is "based upon one or more preexisting 
147. See id. at 125. 
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124-25. 
149. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124-28. 
150. !d. at 127-28. 
151. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) ("A derivative work prepared under the authority of the grant 
before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its 
termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination 
of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated 
grant."). See Nimmer, supra note 90, at 961-63 (describing termination rights as to 
derivative works). 
152. 17 u.s.c. § 203(b)(l). 
153. See id. 
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works."154 But what does "based upon" actually mean in the context 
of technical standards? Debates over the existence of derivative 
works often occur in suits for infringement, in which courts have 
routinely held that infringement stems from the existence of 
"substantial similarity" in the protectable expression of two works. 155 
Examples of derivative works include: a movie based on a play, a 
sculpture based on a drawing, a drawing based on a photo, and a 
musical arrangement based on an older work. 156 As a general matter 
of copyright law, protection for authors of derivative works only 
extends to new additions or changes and does not affect the rights of 
the author of the underlying original work. 157 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the derivative works 
exception to the termination right under Section 304 (mirroring the 
language of Section 203)158 in Mills Music v. Snyder. 159 In Mills 
Music, Ted Snyder, author of the copyrighted song Who's Sorry Now, 
granted the copyright, including Snyder's renewal interest, to music 
publisher Mills Music. 160 Mills Music then licensed the song to over 
400 record companies, who in turn hired separate artists to record 
variations of the song. 161 Snyder's heirs subsequently sought to 
exercise their statutory right of termination, but Mills Music claimed 
that this termination did not apply to the derivative versions of the 
song recorded by other artists. 1 The Court agreed with Mills Music, 
determining that a publisher may continue to share in the royalties 
generated from the licensing of derivative works even after 
termination of the underlying grant by the original author.163 The 
Court focused its interpretation on the meaning of "utilized under the 
terms of the grant after its termination," eventually concluding that 
154. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
155. See, e.g., Peter Lettersee & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int'l, 
533 F.3d 1287, 1299-1302 (11th Cir. 2008); Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning, 386 F.3d 
849, 853 (8th Cir. 2004); Kohus v. Mario!, 328 F.3d 848, 853-54 (6th Cir. 2003); 
Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 186 F .3d 772, 789-90 (5th Cir. 1999). 
156. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 14.0713, COPYRIGHT IN DERIVATIVE WORKS 
AND COMPILATIONS 1 (20 13), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circl4.pdf. 
157. See id. at 2. 
158. See supra note 75 (discussing termination under Section 304). 
159. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985). 
160. /d. at 154-55. 
161. !d. at 158. 
162. /d. at 154-56. 
163. /d. at 155-56, 178. 
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the derivative sound recordings were prepared under the authority of 
the original grant. 164 
Turning to technical standards, the derivative works exception will 
apply in the standards context if a standard can be characterized as a 
derivative work of the individual contributions on which it is 
based. 165 This characterization may be more or less accurate 
depending on the specific facts of each case. For example, a standard 
could represent a synthesis of three independent technical 
contributions or it could simply be a reformatted version of an 
already-mature contribution by a single contributor. In the first case, 
it is likely that the standard would be considered a derivative work of 
each underlying contribution. But in the latter case, treatment as a 
derivative work is less likely. 
If a standard were considered a derivative work of an underlying 
contribution, then if the contributor terminated the SDO' s grant to 
that contribution, the SDO could no longer publish that contribution 
or any new modifications, updates, or standards "based upon" the 
original contribution. 166 The SDO could only continue to distribute 
versions of the standard that were published at the time of 
termination. 167 Given that standards are frequently updated, 
corrected, modified, and improved, an SDO's right to distribute only 
pre-termination versions of a standard is far from ideal. 
E. Underlying Policy Considerations 
Moving beyond the specific language of the statute, it is useful to 
consider the original policy goals of Section 203 when evaluating its 
application to technical standards. As discussed in the Introduction, 
Section 203 was enacted to ensure that authors and artists who 
granted their copyrighted works to large publishers and record labels 
for low initial sums could terminate those grants and renegotiate their 
financial returns if the works were still successful thirty-five years 
164. !d. at 164-65; see also Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 987-88 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that determinations of derivative work status in the context of the 
termination right requires an examination of the rights to which each party was 
entitled before the point of termination). 
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (defining a derivative work as "a work 
based upon one or more preexisting works"). 
166. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(l) (2006); cf Mills Music, Inc., 469 U.S. at 173 & n.40 (1985) 
(applying similar statutory language to a derivative work and finding that only 
previously existing derivative works are excepted). 
167. Cf Mills Music, Inc., 469 U.S. at 173 & n.40 (applying similar statutory language to a 
derivative work and finding that only previously existing derivative works are 
excepted). 
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later. 168 Thus, the underlying goal of the statute is to secure fair 
financial returns to the creators of copyrighted works, even though 
they may have lacked sufficient bargaining power at the time of their 
initial grants. 169 
The scenario could not be more different in the case of technical 
standards. First, there is no imbalance of power in the negotiation of 
standards-related copyright licenses. 170 The firms that employ 
engineers engaged in standardization are among the largest in the 
world, and SDOs are typically organizations formed and run by their 
members. Thus, there is no need to protect the authors of standards 
documents from unfair bargains, as there is with young and unknown 
authors and artists. 
Second, firms engaged in standardization willingly contribute 
copyrighted material to SDOs without compensation. There is no 
expectation that the copyright transfer will ever be remunerative. 171 
The firms that participate in SDOs do so in order to influence the 
technical direction of future products, to ensure that their products 
will be interoperable with others, and to gain valuable market 
intelligence regarding the technical direction of the industry. 172 
These motivations differ from those of individual authors and artists, 
whose sole reward for the transfer of their copyrights is typically the 
remuneration received from the grantee publisher or record label. 173 
Thus, the motivation for Section 203, which allows an author to 
increase his compensation for a work that was difficult to value at the 
time of its initial exploitation, does not exist in the standards 
context. 174 
Finally, the entire market relies on the system of no-compensation, 
perpetual copyright licenses granted with respect to technical 
standards. 175 Allowing authors to revoke copyright grants thirty-five 
years after they are made could wreak havoc with a voluntary 
168. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3); Mills Music, Inc., 469 U.S. at 172-73 & n.39; H.R. REP. No. 
94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659,5739-40. 
169. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124. 
170. See Biddle et a!., The Expanding Role and Importance of Standards, supra note 27, at 
178. 
171. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124. 
172. See Biddle et a!., The Expanding Role and Importance of Standards, supra note 27, at 
178. 
173. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 116-19. 
174. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51, 124. 
175. See IEEE, IEEE POLICIES, supra note 35, § 6.3.1(A)(8) (noting the reliance of the 
technical standards system on no-compensation for developers or employees). 
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consensus standards system that itself is the source of substantial 
economic benefits and social welfare. 176 
V. CONCLUSION 
Both the formal permissibility and the technical feasibility of 
terminating copyright grants under Section 203 in the context of 
technical standards are dubious. In order to effect such a termination, 
either a copyrighted contribution to an SDO must be an individual 
contribution, or a majority of the authors must act in concert, which is 
unlikely after four decades. During that time, authors may die or lose 
track of their commitments. Section 203 expressly prohibits 
termination in the case of works-made-for-hire, which likely 
represent the majority of standards contributions. 177 And even if a 
Section 203 termination were successfully invoked against a 
contribution to a standard, the standard itself could continue to be 
distributed as a derivative work of the underlying contribution. 
Nevertheless, the outcomes described above may be achieved only 
after litigation and the expenditure of significant time and money. 
And, as with all litigation, such outcomes are subject to the vagaries 
of the facts before the court (reflecting the old adage "bad facts make 
bad law"). Thus, we recommend that Congress act promptly to 
clarify, in a categorical fashion that Section 203 does not apply to 
voluntary consensus standards. 178 The time for such legislative 
action is ripe, as the House Judiciary Committee has recently begun 
the first review of comprehensive copyright reform in nearly forty 
years. 179 Alternatively, such legislation could be effected through a 
relatively modest amendment to the Standards Development 
Organization Advancement Act of2004, 180 a statute enacted a decade 
ago to insulate SDOs from certain antitrust claims. In either case, 
176. See Armstrong, supra note 47, at 408-09; see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
supra note 29. 
177. 17 u.s.c. § 203 (2006). 
178. In this recommendation we join Professor Armstrong, who has expressed a similar 
view in order to correct similar inequities in the potential application of Section 203 to 
the termination of open source code licenses. Armstrong, supra note 47, at 416-19. 
179. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, Chairman 




180. Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
237, §§ 101-108, 118 Stat. 661, 661-665 (2004) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4301, et 
seq.). 
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such clarification is needed in order to avoid the disruption and 
uncertainty in the standardization system that could be caused by the 
attempted termination of copyright grants under Section 203. 
